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Application of Regionally Varying Additionality 





The additionality principle says that the funds of the European Union should not replace, but 
be an addition to national regional policy funds. The benchmark for the co-funding is that the 
EU bears 50% of total costs associated with regional projects eligible for EU support. In some 
regions, however, the EU contribution has reached 85% of total costs. This study examines 
how such additionality degrees are determined. Our findings indicate that the regional 
variation of additionality degrees is largely in line with EU cohesion policy goals. Most 
notably, higher shares of EU funds are provided to regions with lower GDP per capita. 
Furthermore, while the share of service-sector employees in a region is negatively related to 
the additionality degree, the impact of the rate of long-term unemployment is positive. 
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1. Introduction 
In the Treaty Establishing the European Community, economic and social cohesion is 
defined in terms of reducing regional disparities in the level of development, usually 
measured by GDP per capita in purchasing power parities. In this context the concept of 
additionality basically rests on a notion according to which, left to themselves, countries 
and regions will under-invest in regional infrastructure, human capital as well as R&D 
and economic activities because of their inability to appropriate all the benefits arising 
from these activities. Additionality means that the funds of the European Union should 
not replace, but be an addition to national regional policy funds. More precisely, it is 
one of the general funding principles by which EU funds for a project are only granted 
to a member state (and its regions) if the member state (and its regions) also contributes. 
Consequently, additionality is anticipated to gauge the difference between the presumed 
underinvestment in regional infrastructure, human capital and economic activities made 
by a country or a region, on the one hand, and the actual (or planned) joint investment 
by the country or a region together with the EU, on the other (see Luukkonen, 2000). 
As a key principle, additionality is underpinning most EU funding for 
infrastructure like new roads or bridges, or schemes to help boost job creation in the 
context of the EU cohesion policy. With the help of the additionality concept, one could 
claim that EU funds would not directly substitute for national or regional investment in 
physical infrastructure, education and training, the knowledge economy as well as 
environmental sustainability, but be somehow additional to that what would have 
happened anyway (Barnett and Borooah, 1995; Buisseret et al., 1995; Bache, 2008). 
This means that national governments and/or regional authorities should not expect a 
free ride from the European Union. However, Ederveen et al. (2002) suggests that EU 
funds may crowd out national financial support to ‘lagging regions’ by, on average, 
17%, in spite of the co-funding requirement of national or regional governments. 
As mentioned above, if funding for a project is covered by the additionality rule, 
the EU will only provide money for the scheme if national authorities also chip in. The 
general rule for such an ‘input’ additionality is a 50-50 split for funding, with half of the 
money coming from national sources and half from the EU coffers. This is the so-called   3
‘matching financial principle’, aimed at ensuring the complementary relationship.
1 
However, for projects implemented in some poorest regions, the EU contribution has 
reached 85% of total costs. The initial logic behind the varying co-funding rates of 
national governments in the EU is simple. For the poor regions, national and regional 
governments lack financial means to co-finance projects and programmes. Therefore, 
the requirement of high co-funding rates would prevent the ‘absorption’ of funds in 
these regions. For such poor regions, a lower co-funding rate of national or regional 
governments (i.e. a higher additionality degree of the EU funding) is desirable to 
stimulate economic growth (Ederveen et al., 2002). 
As already mentioned, additionality is primarily related to the ‘input’ aspect of 
EU regional policy. Yet the efficiency of additionality is also often measured in terms of 
the amount of output from a joint policy as compared with what would have occurred 
without the EU intervention (Pearce and Martin, 1996). Such a type of policy evaluation 
has traditionally been an uneasy and challenging task, and a large number of attempts 
has been carried out on the basis of complicated experimental and modelling approaches 
that also involve the construction of hypothetical, counterfactual situations in which the 
regional project is assumed not to have taken place (Armstrong and Taylor, 1985; Rossi 
and Freeman, 1989; Martin and Tyler, 2006; Bradley, Untiedt and Mitze, 2007; In’t 
Veld, 2007; Bayar, 2007). Thereby, “a [specific] model of the relevant policy area is 
                                                 
1 In general, intergovernmental transfers are aimed at rectifying not only the vertical imbalance caused by 
the unequal own tax revenues and expenditures of different levels of governments, but also the horizontal 
imbalance which is led by the different fiscal capacities among same level jurisdictions. Although the local 
(or regional) expenditure needs appear to be hardly measured in an objective way, the role of transfers 
becomes more crucial for those deficit jurisdictions on the sub-national level, especially when their 
increasing expenditures cannot be financed by borrowing or if they lack direct access to capital markets. In 
the cases of existing externalities on other jurisdictions, the higher-level government also needs to 
financially support sub-national authorities in order to guarantee the provision of certain public services on 
the local (or regional) level like pollution control, inter-regional highways, etc. Furthermore, the amount of 
grants should vary with the local (or regional) expenditure needs and inversely with local fiscal capacity, 
while their distribution must be transparent and fair. More importantly, an effective transfer system should 
neither encourage overspending nor weaken tax collection efforts on the sub-national level. Grants from 
higher (supra-national, federal or state) to lower levels (state, regional or local) can be conditional (i.e. 
closely tied with specifications regarding the use of the funds and/or the performance achieved in the 
supported programme), or unconditional, respecting the autonomy of local governments in spending such 
financial means. The so-called block grants also have a fixed character, which are, however, designed to 
support broad areas of local (or regional) activities (like education, environmental preservation, etc.) 
rather than specific projects. On the other hand, intergovernmental grants can be open-ended — 
regardless of the transfer size required to cover the expenditure needs of individual local governments — 
or subject to certain limits. In addition, the down-flow grants have been quite often made in the EU on the 
basis of the so-called additionality principle, which requires — as an eligibility criterion for the 
supporting grants — the partial financial participation of local governments in providing local goods and 
services in its territory.   4
developed and simulations of varying degrees of sophistication are undertaken to 
ascertain what the level of key [economic] variables [e.g. growth rate, unemployment 
rate, trade volume, technology development and innovation, accessibility, economic 
restructuring, etc.] would have been in the absence of the policy (the policy-off 
situation); these are then compared with actual values of the variables (the policy-on 
period)” (Barnett and Borooah, 1995, p. 185). Yet, apart from the fact that there has 
always been widespread recognition of the likely weakness of such a ‘policy-on’ and 
‘policy-off’ evaluation, and the necessity of continuous methodological improvements 
accompanied by a better availability of relevant data, there is no clear consensus on the 
impact of EU cohesion policy on convergence and economic growth (Ederveen et al., 
2002; Leonardi, 2006). 
On the other hand, the European Commission adopts a more comfortable (but 
rather critical) way to test the additionality. According to the European Commission 
(2006 and 2009), the ex ante verification of additionality takes place at national level if 
the real ‘national public structural aid’ (i.e. ‘expenditures by the member states on EU 
aided programmes’ + ‘expenditures by the member states on programmes similar to 
those supported by the EU Structural Funds but not in receipt of EU supports’) in a 
given EU Support Framework period exceeds that in the base year. 
Most previous evaluation studies do not systematically investigate why different 
‘input’ additionality degrees have been adopted for the eligible regions in the EU, and to 
what extent such a differentiation can be justified in the context of EU cohesion policy. 
To a larger extent, the achievement of additionality and its varying degree from one 
region to another appears to depend on the role which the EU Structural Funds are 
playing. The Structural Funds can basically be seen as performing three types of policy 
role: resource allocation, redistribution and one related to ‘juste retour’ (Barnett and 
Borooah, 1995). Regarding the role of resource allocation policy, it is said that 
challenges resulting from rapid market integration, EU expansion, new technologies and 
demographic changes lead to structural adjustment in the location of economic activity, 
and without an active regional policy supported by the EU, the poor and peripheral 
regions would be worse off – at least in relative terms –, with consequences for 
competitiveness, employment and social cohesion. In order to solve the problem of a 
widening economic disparity between the group of poor regions and that of rich regions,   5
financial transfers appear to be necessary from rich to poor. At the same time, this type 
of redistributive policy serves to stimulate endogenous economic growth in the poor 
regions. Consequently, a high additionality degree applied for the eligible regions could 
generally be justified. Moreover, according to the ‘old’ British view on the role of 
Structural Funds, the EU cohesion policy is assessed, partly at least, as another type of 
redistributive policy mechanism designed to enable a fair and acceptable allocation of 
monies from the EU budget to its member countries, which is also noted by Barnett and 
Borooah (1995): “The fact that the Structural Funds are paid into national treasuries, 
rather than directly to the regions, perhaps represents a further facet of this 
compromise” (Barnett and Borooah, 1995, p. 189). 
This paper aims at examining whether the provision of additionality funds is in 
line with the goals of the EU Cohesion Policy. Since, in the context of EU cohesion 
policy, not only investment in regional infrastructure and human capital but also, for 
example, R&D is promoted, policymakers may consider a variety of variables to make 
decisions about additionality degrees. For this purpose, we investigate various possible 
determinants of EU contribution ratios. Another issue we address is how the cohesion 
policy responds – in terms of varying the additionality degrees between budget periods 
– to, for instance, a rapid growth in GDP per capita. 
Our findings indicate that the regional GDP per capita is one important 
determinant that can explain the share of funds provided to the regions. The preferred 
specification of our estimations suggests that a 10 percent increase in GDP per capita is 
associated with a 2.6 (3) percentage point reduction in the additionality degree for the 
2000-2006 (2007-2013) period. We can also show that the EU provides a higher share 
of additional funds to regions lagging behind in terms of the local labour market. More 
precisely, we find that a higher share of service-sector employees is associated with a 
lower additionality degree, whereas a higher long-term unemployment rate implies a 
higher additionality degree. 
The study is structured as follows. Section 2.1 gives an overview on the EU 
cohesion policy, with an emphasis on how funds are allocated and how this changed 
over time. In Section 2.2 we take a closer look at the additionality degrees of the 
regions. Subsequently, in Section 3, we describe our data and variables used in the 
empirical analysis. In Section 4 we present our regression results. The empirical   6
investigation considers both budget periods (2000-2006 and 2007-2013) and the change 
of contribution ratios between budget periods. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
 
2  Changes of EU Cohesion Policy Practice and Additionality: A 
Comparison of Budget Years 2000-2006 and 2007-2013  
2.1.  Changes of Cohesion Policy 
The EU cohesion policy has been continuously reformed. For instance, the 
simplification of its structure and the preparation of EU enlargement from EU15 to 
EU25 were the two major slogans of the period 2000-2006. The latter event has led to 
increased regional disparities in income and employment in the EU, since the average 
GDP per capita in the ten new Member States was under half of the EU average and 
only around 55% of their population were in active employment, compared with 
approximately 65% in EU15. The entire 2000-2006 budget for the EU cohesion policy 
amounted to 213 billion euros for the EU15, which was added by an extra sum of 22 
billion euros provided exclusively for the new Member States for the period 2004-2006 
(European Commission, 2004). The EU aimed at three policy objectives:  
  Objective 1: promoting the development and structural adjustment of regions in 
which GDP per capita does not reach 75% of the EU average,
2 
  Objective 2: supporting the economic and social conversion of areas facing 
structural difficulties, and 
  Objective 3: stimulating the adaptation and modernisation of policies and 
systems of education, training and employment. 
Objective 1 regions cover 37% of the total EU25 population (about 170 million 
inhabitants). The financial resources provided by the EU Structural Funds – European 
Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the European Social Fund (ESF), the European 
Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Funds (EAGGF) and the Financial Instrument for 
Fisheries and Guidance (FIFG) – reached around 150 billion euros in the period 2000-
2006 under Objective 1 treatment, while additional 25 billion euros were added under 
                                                 
2 The new Member States’ territory almost completely fell under Objective 1, eligible for the highest 
possible level of support from the Structural and Cohesion Funds.   7
the Cohesion Fund. Around 40% of 175 billion euros was spent on infrastructure in this 
period, of which just under half was allocated to transport and a third to environment. In 
addition, about 34% and 25% of 175 billion euros were allocated to creating a 
productive environment for enterprises and to human resources, respectively. 
More than 15% of the EU25 population (i.e. 70 million people) lived in 
Objective 2 areas and benefited from a funding package of around 23 billion euros 
additionally provided by the ERDF and the ESF in the period 2000-2006. Of this total 
amount, around 55% was spent on productive environment, supporting particularly 
SMEs in these regions, 24% on physical regeneration and environment, often for former 
industrial sites, and the rest 21% on human resources. Focusing on target groups for 
active labour market policies, programmes under Objectives 3 and 4 had no 
geographical concentration and were agreed at national level instead. The total amount 
for both objectives was approximately 24 billion euros provided by the ESF. 
Furthermore, approx. 12 billion euros were spent for four Community initiatives 
including Interreg III, Urban II, Equal and Leader+ and other cross-border cooperation 
projects during the 2000-2006 period (European Commission, 2004). 
The Lisbon Agenda agreed by EU leaders at the Lisbon summit in March 2000 
aims at making the EU a more competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the 
world, which would be achieved by economic reforms and growth-enhancing investments. 
In this regard the European Commission (2007) lays great emphasis on the fact that the 
cohesion policy should be confluent with the goals of the Lisbon strategy by promoting 
growth and employment. Consequently, compared to the previous EU financial supports 
from Structural Funds which used to be concentrated on infrastructure and human capital 
development, the Lisbon strategy’s stress on the knowledge economy raised new policy 
orientations for the EU cohesion policy. 
In the context of the ‘new’ cohesion policy, around 347 billion euros are being 
spent over the seven-year period from 2007 to 2013, supporting regional growth and 
stimulating job creation. More than 80% of total funds (i.e. 283 billion euros) are 
allocated to the ‘Convergence’ regions, defined by GDP per capita of less than 75% of 
the EU average, which account for 35% of the EU’s total population. While merging the 
previous Objectives 2 and 3, some 55 billion euros are being allocated in the remaining 
regions under the Regional Competitiveness and Employment objective. Another 8.7   8
billion euros are available for cross-border, transnational and interregional cooperation 
under the European Territorial Cooperation objective. The three objectives are 
supported by the ERDF, the Cohesion Fund and the ESF. The ERDF promotes 
programmes on regional development, economic change, enhanced competitiveness and 
territorial cooperation throughout the EU, while the Cohesion Fund mainly supports 
transport and environment infrastructure, as well as energy efficiency and renewable 
energy in Member States with a gross national income (GNI) lower than 90% of the EU 
average. 
Under the Convergence objective, ERDF actions will concentrate on 
strengthening infrastructure, economic competitiveness, research, innovation and 
sustainable regional development. Under the Competitiveness objective, the ERDF sets 
three priorities: innovation and the knowledge economy, the environment and risk 
prevention, and access – away from urban centres – to transport and telecommunication. 
Throughout the EU, under both the Convergence and the Regional Competitiveness and 
Employment objectives, the ESF provides support to anticipate and manage economic 
and social change. There are four key areas for action: increasing adaptability of 
workers and enterprises; enhancing access to employment and participation in the 
labour market; reinforcing social inclusion by combating discrimination and facilitating 
access to the labour market for disadvantaged people; promoting reform in employment 
and inclusion. Under the Convergence objective, the ESF also supports efforts to 
improve education and training, and help develop institutional capacity and the 
efficiency of public administrations. Across all cohesion policy programmes, the main 
fields of investment and their relative shares of funding are classified into:  
  Knowledge and innovation: almost 83 billion euros (24% of 347 billion euros) 
are being spent on, for example, research centres and infrastructure, technology 
transfer and innovation in firms, and the development and diffusion of 
information and communication technologies. 
  Transport: about 76 billion euros (22%) have been allocated to improving the 
accessibility of regions, supporting trans-European networks, and investing in 
environmentally sustainable transport facilities in urban areas in particular. 
  Environmental protection and risk prevention: investments of around 51 billion 
euros (19%) aim at financing water and waste-treatment infrastructures,   9
decontamination of land in order to prepare it for new economic use, and 
protection against environmental risks. 
  Human resources: around 76 billion euros (22%) are allocated on education, 
training, employment and social inclusion schemes financed by the ESF. Other 
interventions concern the promotion of entrepreneurship, energy networks and 
efficiency, urban and rural regeneration, tourism, culture and strengthening the 
institutional capacity of public administrations (see European Commission, 
2008). 
2.2. Dispersion  of  Additionality Degrees and Their Changes 
For the operational programmes officially adopted by the European Commission at the 
beginning of the budget years, the total costs of regional programmes and the respective 
EU contributions are reported.
3 These programmes were prepared by each EU member 
state and present the priorities selected by the national and regional authorities for the 
corresponding budget period.
4 We are interested in the share of such supra-national 
grants that are directly addressed to respective regions. We calculate the relevant 
variable as EU contribution divided by total cost of the regional programme. For the 
2000-2006 programme, the EU bears on average 46% of costs incurred by the regions. 
With respect to the 2007-2013 programme, the average EU contribution rate lies about 
10 percentage points higher compared with the earlier period, amounting approx. 57% 
(see Figure 1 and Table 2 in Section 3). 
Figure 1 clearly indicates that the additionality degrees increased from the first 
to the second budget period. Displayed are standard box plots for the two programme 
periods. The same figure also demonstrates that some regions are provided with a very 
high degree of additionality. The region with the highest EU contribution rate in the 
2000-2006 period was the Região Autónoma dos Açores that belongs to Portugal. The 
EU provided around 78% of the funds for regional projects in this case. For the 2007-
                                                 
3 See http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/country/prordn/index_en.cfm. There are also national, multi-
regional as well as cross-border regional cooperation programmes which are financially supported by the 
EU. Yet, for such programmes, the distribution of project costs from one region to another is unclear. 
4 According to the well-known subsidiarity principle, efficiency in the allocation of financial resources is 
best achieved by assigning responsibility for each type of expenditure to the level of government that 
most closely represents the beneficiaries of provided public goods and services. In other words, the 
expenditure assignments involve decisions as to which level of government should be predominantly 
responsible for the formulation, financing and administration of policy activities and related follow-ups.   10
2013 period, the maximum share of funds was provided to Lithuania, where around 
87% of project costs are contributed by the EU. Figure 1 also reveals that the 
additionality degree is significantly lower in other regions. The lowest contribution ratio 
lies at only 16% (2000-2006) and 24% (2007-2013), respectively.  
 
Figure 1: Dispersion of additionality degree for EU regions  








.2 .4 .6 .8 1
Period2000 Period2007
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations 
 
In the following, the changes of additionality degrees for the individual EU regions, 
which are applied in the context of the EU regional support programmes in the budget 
periods 2000-2006 and 2007-2013, are descriptively examined. For such a comparison, 
101 eligible EU regions, for which data is available for both budget periods, are 
considered. An additionality degree of 50% is set as the benchmark, according to which 
regions are classified (see Table 1). Firstly, it is to note that, regardless of the budget 
periods, most Objective 1 regions are located in the fields with the additionality degree 
over 50%. In particular, the additionality degree of all the investigated German, Spanish 
and Portuguese Objective 1 regions remained higher than 50% in both surveyed budget 
periods (see also below).   11
Of all the investigated EU regions, sixty-two regions benefit from an increased 
share of EU financial aid (‘winners’), while a decrease is reported in thirty regions 
(‘losers’). The additionality degree has remained more or less the same in nine regions 
including also some Spanish and Finnish Objective 1 regions (Extramadura, Melila, 
Castilla la Mancha, Itä-Suomi and Pohjois-Suomi) in addition to French Guyana. As 
illustrated in Table 1, Austrian and German regions are the clear winners. In contrast, 
the classification gets rather heterogeneous if the regions in France, Italy and Spain are 
taken into account. In France, for example, most investigated regions (except Bretagne 
and the three Objective 1 regions Guadeloupe, Martinique and Réunion) belong to the 
group with the additionality degree below 50% in both budget periods and the larger 
share of these regions (including Île de France,  Picardie,  Basse-Normandie, 
Bourgogne, Lorraine, etc.) was able to increase the additionality degree in the budget 
period 2007-2013. For Italy, it is particularly noteworthy that all the Objective 1 regions 
(Sardegna, Basilicata, Sicilia, Campania, Puglia and Calabria) are classified as losers, 
i.e. their additionality degrees decreased. Consequently, none of Italian regions belong 
to the group with the additionality degree over 50% in the latter budget period. 
Heterogeneity related to the changes of additionality degrees also exists in the group of 
Spanish Objective 1 regions: five regions (Galicia, Asturias, Castilla y León, Andalucia 
and  Murcia) could achieve an improvement of the additionality degree, whereas it 
decreased in Communidad Valenciana, Ceuta and Canarias in the budget period 2007-
2013. 
 
3.  Data and Variables Used in the Empirical Investigation 
In order to test how EU policymakers decide on the extent of involvement expressed in 
terms of additionality degrees, we condition on several explanatory variables. Control 
variables for the regional entities are taken from different sources (see Table A1 in the 
Appendix for further information on data sources), including a study of the European 
Parliament (see European Parliament, 2007), the EU Regio database, and the European 
Regional Innovation Scoreboard (see Hollanders, 2006).    12
Table 1: Classification of EU regions according to additionality degrees and their changes 
between the budget periods of 2000-2006 and 2007-2013 
Budget year 2007-2013   






















Hainaut (B) ↑ 
 
Hamburg (D) ↑ 
 
Southern and Eastern Region (IR) ↓ 
 
Pais Vasco (ES) ↑; La Rioja (ES) ↑; Madrid 
(ES) ↓; Cataluña (ES) ↑; Illes Balears (ES) ↓ 
 
Île de France (FR) ↑; Champagne-Ardenne 
(FR) ↓; Picardie (FR) ↑; Haute-Normandie 
(FR) ↓; Centre (FR) =; Basse-Normandie (FR) 
↑; Bourgogne (FR) ↑; Nord- as-de-Calais (FR) 
↓; Lorraine (FR) ↑; Alsace (FR) ↓; Franche-
Comté (FR) =; Pays de la Loire (FR) ↑; Poitou-
Charentes (FR) ↑; Aquitaine (FR) ↑; Midi-
Pyrénées (FR) ↑; Limousin (FR) ↑; Rhône-
Alpes (FR) ↑; Auvergne (FR) ↑; Languedoc-
Roussillon (FR) ↑; Provence-Alpes-Côte 
d’Azur (FR) ↑; Corse (FR) ↓; Guyana (FR) = 
 
Piemonte (IT) =; Valle d’Aosta (IT) =; Liguria 
(IT) ↑; Lombardia (IT) ↓; Veneto (IT) ↓; Friuli-
Venezia Giulia (IT) ↓; Emilia-Romagna (IT) ↓; 
Toscana (IT) ↑; Umbria (IT) ↑; Marche (IT) ↑; 
Abruzzo (IT) ↑; Molise (IT) ↓; Sardegna (IT) 
↓ 
 
Etelä-Suomi (FI) ↑;Länsi-Suomi (FI) ↑ 
 
Highlands and Islands (UK) ↑ 
Région de Bruxelles-Capitale (B) ↑ 
 
Navarra (ES) ↑; Aragón (ES) ↑ 
 
Martinique (FR) ↑ 
 
Lazio (IT) ↑ 
 
Niederösterreich (AT) ↑; Wien (AT) ↑; 
Kärnten (AT) ↑; Steiermark (AT) ↑; 
Oberösterreich (AT) ↑; Salzburg (AT) ↑; 
Tirol (AT) ↑ 
 
Åland (FI) ↑ 
 
West Midlands (UK) ↑ 
Saarland (D) ↑; Schleswig-Holstein (D) ↑ 
 
Bretagne (FR) ↑; Guadeloupe (FR) ↑ 
 
Burgenland (AT) ↑; Vorarlberg (AT) ↑ 
 
Cornwall and Isles of Scilly (UK) ↑; 




Bolzano-Bozen (IT) ↓; Basilicata (IT) ↓; 
Sicilia (IT) ↓ 










Border, Midlands and Western Region (IR) 
↓ 
 
Lisboa (PT) ↓ 
Cantabria (ES) ↓ 
 
Campania  (IT) ↓; Puglia (IT) ↓; Calabria 
(IT) ↓ 
 
Algarve (PT) ↓ 
 
Northern Ireland (UK) ↓ 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (D) ↑; 
Sachsen-Anhalt (D) ↑; Thüringen (D) ↑ 
 
Attiki (GR) ↑ 
 
Galicia (ES) ↑; Asturias (ES) ↑; Castilla 
y León (ES) ↑; Castilla la Mancha (ES) 
=; Extremadura (ES) =; Comunidad 
Valenciana (ES) ↓; Andalucia (ES) ↑; 
Murcia (ES) ↑; Ceuta (ES) ↓; Melilla 
(ES) =; Canarias (ES) ↓ 
 
Réunion (FR) ↑ 
 
Norte (PT) ↑; Açores (PT) ↑; Madeira 
(PT) ↑ 
Note:  Objective 1 regions are written in bold letters. 
The sign ↑ indicates ‘increase’ (‘winners’); ↓ ‘decrease’ (‘losers’) and = ‘no change’, when the additionality degree of a region applied in the budget period 
2007-2013 is compared to that adopted in the budget period 2000-2006. 
Source: European Commission, Regional Policy – Inforegio, http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/country/prordn/index_en.cfm. 
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Since the basic decision problem of the European Commission is concerned with 
providing funds to the structurally weak regions, we presume that policymakers use 
GDP per capita (measured in PPS) as an economic yardstick for the extent of financial 
support. Accordingly, if GDP per capita is high in a region, the European Commission 
should provide only a low share of financing. Figure 2 displays the relationship between 
regional GDP per capita (in PPS) and additionality degree. These simple bivariate 













































log GDP per capita (in Euro)
Graphs by Period
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations 
 
While the EU cohesion policy aims at promoting lagging regions, the regional 
GDP per capita may not be the only measure used by the decision-makers. Variables of 
particular interest are presumably measures that proxy for features of the local labour 
market. As the EU intends to promote regions with structural difficulties, one 
                                                 
5 Note that GDP per capita (in PPS) applied for the development of the 2007-2013 programme refers to 
the 2006 GDP per capita of the respective region as this should be the relevant figure available to the 
decision-makers. Correspondingly, we use the 1999 GDP per capita for the 2000-2007 programme.   15
appropriate variable might be the employment in the Service sector relative to total 
employment. A high share of employment in the service sector indicates that some 
structural change (‘deindustrialization’) has already taken place in a region. For this 
reason, the service variable is expected to exert a negative effect on the additionality 
degree. Further potentially relevant labour-market variables are the Unemployment ratio 
and the Long-term unemployment ratio. The variable for the long-term unemployed 
refers to the long-term-unemployment-to-total-employment ratio. A high ratio implies 
that the region is lagging in terms of structural adjustment, suggesting a positive impact 
on the share of EU funds provided. We also expect that the unemployment ratio relates 
positively to the share of funds provided. However, whether this holds in a multivariate 
regression has to be investigated in the next section. 
We further control for the local Population density and the Land area to control 
for size effects. A variable that may proxy for the level of development of a region is the 
share of the regional population that lives within 1-hour car driving time from the next 
airport (Airport accessibility). Besides, the variable GDP accessibility is an indicator of 
the size of market areas for suppliers of high-order business services. 
Since, according to the Lisbon strategy, one goal of the EU cohesion policy is to 
stimulate innovation which leads to growth, we also condition on a variable that might 
capture this aspect. A high score on the 2006 Regional Innovation Scoreboard (RIS) is 
associated with an enhanced performance in terms of innovation. This composite 
indicator comprises various aspects such as business and public R&D expenditures, 
employment in high-tech manufacturing and service sector, patent statistics, etc. (see 
Table A1 in the Appendix). Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for all variables used 
in our empirical analysis.   16
Table 2: Descriptive statistics, programmes 2007-2013 and 2000-2006 
Programme 2007-2013 
Variable Mean  Standard  Error  Minimum  Maximum 
Share  2007  .562 .200 .244 .872 
ln(GDP per capita)  9.95  .400  9.04  11.05 
Service  .648 .094 .442 .887 
Unemployment  ratio  .087 .038 .026 .192 
Long-term unemployment   .397  .148  .121  .679 
ln(Population  density)  4.75 1.19 1.19 8.75 
ln(Land area)  9.52           1.16  5.08  11.94 
Airport accessibility  .475             .297  0  1 
ln(GDP accessibility)  3.98 1.01 .788 6.46 
RIS
(a)  .416 .155 .070 .900 
Notes: 131 observations; 
(a)116 observations. GDP per capita refers to the 2006 regional GDP per capita in PPS. 
Service is the ratio of employment in the service sector to total employment in 2005. Unemployment ratio is the 
unemployment rate in 2006. Long-term unemployment is measured as long-term unemployed as share of total 
unemployed persons. Population density is the regional population density measured as inhabitant per square 
kilometre in 2005. Land area is the land area of the region measured in square kilometres. Airport accessibility is 
defined as the share of the regional population living within 1-hour car driving time from next airport. GDP 
accessibility is an indicator of the size of market areas for suppliers of high-level business services. RIS is an indicator 
published in 2006 that comprises the overall innovation performance of a region. 
Source: Authors’ own calculations.  
 
Programme 2000-2006 
Variable Mean  Standard  Error  Minimum  Maximum 
Share  2000  .435 .177 .155 .751 
ln(GDP per capita)  9.82  .311  8.71  10.74 
Service  .677             .083  .475  .887 
Unemployment ratio  .090  .052  .022  .26 
Long-term  unemployment  .411 .128 .135 .679 
ln(Population  density)  4.93 1.26 1.55 8.70 
ln(Land area)  9.20           1.25  5.08  11.80 
Airport accessibility  .559  .282  0  1 
ln(GDP accessibility)  4.25 1.18 1.34 6.46 
RIS
(b)  .400 .161 .010 .780 
Notes: 98 observations; 
(b)88 observations. GDP per capita refers to the 1999 regional GDP per capita in PPS. Service 
is the ratio of employment in the service sector to total employment in 2005. Unemployment ratio is the 
unemployment rate in 1999. Long-term unemployment is measured as long-term unemployed as share of total 
unemployed persons. Population density is the regional population density measured as inhabitant per square 
kilometre in 1999. Land area is the land area of the region measured in square kilometres. Airport accessibility is 
defined as the share of the regional population living within 1-hour car driving time from next airport. GDP 
accessibility is an indicator of the size of market areas for suppliers of high-level business services. RIS is an indicator 
published in 2006 that comprises the overall innovation performance of a region. 
Source: Authors’ own calculations.   17
4. Regression  Results 
4.1.  Period 2007-2013  
The major aim of the empirical investigation is to explain the differences in 
additionality degrees in the 2007-2013 programme, of which results are presented in 
Table 3.
6 In a first regression, only the natural logarithm of the GDP per capita is 
included. As expected, a higher GDP per capita is associated with a lower additionality 
degree. Note that this specification already explains almost 40% of the variation of our 
dependent variable. In column II we include further control variables that proxy for 
different aspects of regional labour markets. We find that a high share of service-sector 
employment induces the EU to provide a lower share of funds. On the contrary, a higher 
unemployment ratio leads to a higher additionality degree. However, this variable is not 
statistically significant. The variable that measures the share of long-term 
unemployment is also not significantly related to the dependent variable. In column III, 
we include population density and land area. A higher population density is positively, 
the size of a region in terms of land area is negatively related to the share of EU funds 
provided.  
We add further control variables in column IV. Note, though, that we lose 
observations since the new indicators are not available for all regions. While the 
accessibility of airports is not significant, a better GDP accessibility leads to a lower 
additionality degree. At the same time, the GDP-per-capita effect becomes less 
pronounced. Although the coefficient of the innovative performance measured by the 
RIS indicator is positive, it is statistically not significant.  
With respect to the magnitude of effects, the coefficient in column III implies 
that a 10% increase in GDP per capita leads to a 3 percentage point lower additionality 
degree. 10 percentage points less employment in the service sector is associated with a 5 
percentage point increase in the share of funds provided by the EU.  
 
                                                 
6 To begin with, we investigate the 2007-2013 budget period, since this is the recent time horizon and, 
moreover, the availability of data (also the number of regions eligible for EU funds) is better, compared 
with the earlier period.   18
Table 3: Results (2007-2013) 
 I  II  III  IV 
ln(GDP per capita)  -0.311*** -0.182**  -0.301*** -0.159** 
  [0.035] [0.072] [0.075] [0.073] 
Service   -0.513**  -0.501**  -0.712*** 
    [0.230] [0.177] [0.222] 
Unemployment  ratio    0.467 0.457 0.135 
    [0.990] [0.847] [0.809] 
Long-term unemployment    0.114  -0.190  -0.070 
    [0.243] [0.240] [0.240] 
ln(Population density)      0.028  0.071* 
     [0.021]  [0.038] 
ln(Land area)      -0.033*  -0.039 
     [0.019]  [0.025] 
Airport accessibility        -0.100 
       [0.064] 
ln(GDP accessibility)        -0.097** 
       [0.039] 
RIS       0.173 
       [0.144] 
Observations  131 131 131 116 
R-squared  0.386 0.415 0.482 0.513 
Notes: OLS estimation, including an intercept (not reported). Robust standard errors 
(clustered by country) in brackets. If available, all control variables refer to 2006 values 
(see Table 2 for further definitions of control variables). * significant at 10%; ** significant 
at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Source: Authors’ own calculations. 
  
4.2. Period  2000-2006  
In Table 4 we investigate the earlier programme by replicating the above regression 
analysis. The number of observations is now smaller and we have the problem that not 
all control variables are available for the year 1999. Since information from this year 
was probably the basis for the EU’s decision-making, the results need careful 
interpretation. Nonetheless, the findings are basically consistent compared with the 
results of the budget period of 2007-2013.  
The regional GDP per capita is again negatively related to the share of funds 
provided. According to column III, a 10% increase in GDP per capita leads to a 2.6 
percentage point lower additionality degree, which is quite similar to the case of the 
2007-2013 period. The most noticeable difference between the samples of the different 
programme periods is that the measure for long-term unemployment is now highly 
significant. According to specification II, a ten percentage point higher share of long-  19
term unemployed is associated with a 4 to 5 percentage point, depending on the 
specification, higher EU contribution rate. The GDP per capita variable loses some 
significance as soon as we include GDP accessibility in column IV. If the RIS index is 
included in specification V, GDP per capita is no longer significant. Note, however, that 
this result should not be overemphasized, as the RIS variable is not available for all 
regions and the number of observations is reduced to 88. Despite the fact that periods 
2000-2006 and 2007-2013 are not thoroughly comparable, it seems that the goal of the 
2000-2006 period was to provide funds to regions where long-term unemployment is an 
issue.  
 
Table 4: Results (2000-2006) 
 I  II  III  IV  V 
ln(GDP per capita)  -0.315***  -0.252***  -0.263***  -0.072*  -0.041 
  [0.095] [0.084] [0.075] [0.042] [0.053] 
Service   -0.102  -0.314  -0.398  -0.277 
   [0.240]  [0.261]  [0.262]  [0.298] 
Unemployment ratio    -0.304  0.068  -0.319  -0.490 
   [0.578]  [0.553]  [0.329]  [0.352] 
Long-term  unemployment    0.566*** 0.453** 0.441*** 0.486** 
   [0.188]  [0.168]  [0.137]  [0.182] 
ln(Population density)      -0.010  0.069***  0.075*** 
     [0.021]  [0.015]  [0.021] 
ln(Land)     -0.040  -0.013  0.002 
     [0.029]  [0.012]  [0.012] 
Airport accessibility       -0.059  -0.057 
       [0.058]  [0.059] 
ln(GDP accessibility)       -0.120***  -0.109*** 
       [0.018]  [0.023] 
RIS       -0.216 
       [0.137] 
Observations  98 98 98 98 88 
R-squared  0.308 0.435 0.476 0.688 0.713 
Notes: OLS estimation, including an intercept (not reported). Robust standard errors (clustered by country) in 
brackets. If available, all control variables refer to 1999 values (see Table 2 for further definitions of control 
variables). * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Source: Authors’ own calculations. 
 
4.2.  Change in Additionality Degrees 
In Table 5 we consider the change in the share of funds provided by the EU. Since some 
variables do not vary over time, e.g. the land area, or no time-varying data is available   20
for indicators like GDP accessibility, the number of explanatory variables is now 
reduced. Column I provides results where the change in the region’s GDP per capita is 
used as the only right-hand side variable. The positive coefficient means that a rise in 
GDP per capita is reflected in a higher additionality degree. This result should be 
interpreted very carefully and rather descriptively, as endogeneity issues may be 
important here. Column II reveals that an increase in unemployment leads to a higher 
degree of additionality, which is in line with the goals of the cohesion policy. 
Finally, in column III, we include the 1999 GDP per capita to control for level 
effects. The results are very similar to the findings in columns I and II and the 
coefficients for the change in GDP per capita and the change in Population density are 
exactly the same.  
 
Table 5: Change in additionality 
 I  II  III 
ln ( GDP per capita)  0.063**  0.077**  0.077** 
  [0.025] [0.030] [0.031] 
 Unemployment ratio   1.314*  1.299 
   [0.672]  [0.739] 
 Population density   -0.001*  -0.001* 
   [0.000]  [0.000] 
ln (GDP per capita in 1999)      0.005 
     [0.058] 
Observations 102  71  71 
R-squared  0.083 0.285 0.286 
Notes: OLS estimation, including an intercept (not reported). Robust standard 
errors (clustered by country) in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant 
at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Source: Authors’ own calculations. 
 
5. Conclusions 
We have investigated how the EU decides on the scope of grants that are provided to 
regions to support local projects. In this context, the concept of additionality is 
important, because EU funds are only provided if nations (and/or regions) also 
contribute own funds to co-finance these projects. Hence, additionality degrees indicate 
the share of total costs of regional projects that are borne by the EU. Such additionality 
degrees vary significantly across regions. In some cases the figure amounts to more than 
85%, whereas in other cases the EU contributes less than 20%.    21
We use data from the EU regional programme database that includes total costs 
of regional programmes and the funds that are contributed by the EU. We use this 
information to calculate additionality degrees, which we then examine in regression 
analyses. Our findings suggest that the additionality degree is mainly determined by the 
regional GDP per capita, which is in line with the EU cohesion policy goals. Our 
estimated coefficients suggest that a 10% higher GDP per capita (measured in PPS) is 
associated with a 2.6 (3) percentage point reduction in the additionality degree for the 
2000-2006 (2007-2013) period. Another finding is that a higher share of employees in 
the service sector is associated with a lower additionality degree. Finally, a higher share 
of long-term unemployment implies a higher additionality degree. 
Our main conclusion is that the EU expenditure practice made in terms of the 
Structural Funds is largely in line with cohesion policy goals. However, we are not able 
to explain all of the variation of additionality degrees with independent variables that 
are available from official data sources. The remaining variation may, for example, be 
explained by differences in negotiation and bargaining power or by strategies of the 
national and regional representatives. A higher degree of transparency concerning the 
allocation of funds would certainly help to make this process more efficient. Further 
insights may also be useful to improve the quality of future evaluation studies as to 
whether EU funds tend to crowd out national funds.  
   22
Appendix  
Table A1: Variable description and data sources 
Variable   Description  Database 
Share 2000  Funds provided by the EU 
relative to total expenditures for 
the budget period 2000-2006  
EU Regional programme 
2000-2006 
Share 2007  Funds provided by the EU 
relative to total expenditures for 
the budget period 2007-2013 
EU Regional programme 
2007-2013 
GDP per capita   Regional GDP per capita (in 
PPS); yearly data 1999-2006  
EU Regio database 
Service  Employment in service sector 
(in % of total employment in 
2005) 
EU Regio database 
Unemployment ratio  Unemployment rate 1999-2006  EU Regio database 
Long-term unemployment   Long-term unemployment in 
2005 as share of total 
unemployed persons  
EU Regio database 
Population density  Regional population density 
measured as inhabitant per 
square kilometre (1999-2006) 
EU Regio database 
Land area  Land area in square kilometre  EU Regio database 
Airport accessibility  Share of regional population 
living within 1 hour car driving 
time from next airport 
Study of the European 
Parliament (2007) 
Potential GDP accessibility**  An indicator of the size of 
market areas for suppliers of 
high-level business services, 
standardized at EU27+2*** 
Study of the European 
Parliament (2007) 
RIS (Regional Innovation 
Scoreboard) 2006* 
A re-scaled synthetic indicator 
showing the overall innovation 
performance of regions in the 
EU 
Hollanders (2006) 
*  The RIS 2006 is calculated based on a set of seven determinants, capturing human resource and knowledge 
creation indicators from different statistical sources such as labour force survey, R&D statistics and patent statistics. 
These seven determinants include: (1) human resources in science and technology – core (% of population in 2004), 
(2) participation in life-long learning (% of 25–64 years age class in 2004), (3) employment in medium-high and 
high-tech manufacturing (% of total workforce in 2004), (4) employment in high-tech services (% of total 
employment in 2004), (5) public R&D expenditures (total R&D expenditures – business expenditures on R&D) (% of 
GDP in 2002), (6) business expenditures on R&D (% of GDP in 2002), and (7) The European Patent Office (EPO) 
patent applications (per million population in 2002). 
**  Potential accessibility is measured based on the assumption that the attraction of a destination increases 
with size, and declines with distance, travel time or cost. Destination size is usually represented by GDP or 
population. In other words, the potential accessibility is a construct of two functions, the activity function representing 
the activities or opportunities to be reached and the impedance function representing the effort, time, distance or cost 
needed to reach them. For potential accessibility the two functions are combined multiplicatively. 
*** Switzerland  and  Norway.   23
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